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The quest for transparency spans countries, policymakers, NGOs, and industries.1
Transparency can be deﬁned as disclosing to the public, in a timely and reliable
manner, information that governments and/or corporations previously con-
sidered conﬁdential. Recent examples include the Carbon Disclosure Project,
the Aarhus convention on access to environmental information, the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety and its provisions on global genetically modiﬁed organism
ﬂows, and a wide array of ﬁnancial information (e.g., in the G8 declaration of
Lough Erne in 2013). Stemming from the “right to know,” advocates from NGOs
and development organizations view transparency as a cure for corruption and a
beneﬁt for democratic accountability; transparency should lead to stakeholder
empowerment and improve legitimacy, learning, investment certainty, and
better governance.
In this article I look at the efforts to establish ﬁnancial transparency as a
norm for the extractive sector. This sector is important because its activities
are accompanied by a high level of corruption, especially in resource-rich
developing countries. I show that those efforts are not enough and there is
good evidence to demand more. I argue that such transparency norms should
Global Environmental Politics 14:4, November 2014, doi:10.1162/GLEP_e_00254
© 2014 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
* This paper resulted from a fellowship at the American Institute for Contemporary German Stud-
ies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, in May and June 2013; i am grateful
to AICGS and its fantastic staff for this opportunity. During that time I was able to contact the
following experts who shared valuable information and perspectives with me: Eduardo Aleman,
Evan Armstrong, Diana Bauer, Erik Brattberg, Matthew Burrows, Philip J. Daniel, John H.
DeYoung Jr., Sebastian Ehreiser, Hilary French, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Virginia Hauﬂer, Marc
Levy, Jennifer Li, Frank Loy, John Meakem, David Menzie, Kate McNulty, Alexander Ochs, Cyrus
Wadia, Michael Weber. At an AICGS seminar on June 25, 2013, participants contributed useful
viewpoints. I owe special thanks to Patrick Schmitz for excellent research support at AICGS,
Jessica Riester and Michelle O’Keeffe for editing, and two anonymous reviewers for additional
helpful comments. All remaining errors should be blamed on the author.
1. Gupta 2010; Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Revenue Watch Institute 2013.
1
be extended to environmental pressures in order to facilitate progress on the
circular economy and resource efﬁciency. My conclusions point at synergies
between knowledge generation across ﬁnancial and environmental information.
What’s Going On: The Dodd-Frank Act, EU Followers,
and Related Initiatives
Milestones toward a politics of transparency have already been reached:
• The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)2 is a coalition of
governments, companies, civil society groups, investors, and international
organizations. Its global standard requires disclosure of corporate pay-
ments to governments and related government revenues. Country reports
are public and undergo independent veriﬁcation. As of December 2013,
twenty-four countries were EITI-compliant; the reported payments total
around US $1 trillion.
• The 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act3 aims to regulate the ﬁnancial markets.
Section 1502 contains rules on the use of conﬂict minerals4 by stock
exchange-listed companies, while Section 1504 contains rules on trans-
parency in the extractive industry. Companies must submit annual reports
to the US Securities and Exchange Commission, disclosing payments made
to governments at both the country (including sub-national) level and the
project level. InAugust 2012, the commission adopted the long-awaited rules
for implementation.
• In June, 2013, the European Parliament (EP)5 decided on transparency
rules for the extractive industries—including the forestry sector—that are
quite comparable to those of the SEC. All payments above A100,000
made to federal, national, and regional governments will be published.
Small and medium-sized ﬁrms are exempted from those new provisions.
Though a few parts of the ﬁnal version were weaker than the draft, the
EP removed the “tyrant’s veto;” this clause exempts companies from report-
ing where a host country’s criminal law bans such disclosure.
The nongovernmental organizations Global Witness, Oxfam, and Publish
What You Pay are particularly active in pushing the transparency agenda. The
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have long supported transparency and
have their own transparency guidelines since the early 2000s. Today, all major
2. See http://eiti.org as well as Aaronson (2011); Hauﬂer (2010), Schuler (2012).
3. See http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml.
4. Conﬂict minerals are those that are exploited, controlled, or used to ﬁnance the purchase of
supplies by armed actors in a conﬂict.
5. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/content/20130607IPR11387/html/
Oil-gas-mineral-and-logging-ﬁrms-obliged-to-disclose-payments-to-governments.
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mining companies support the EITI, and over eighty institutional investors,
who collectively manage assets in excess of US$19 trillion, have declared their
support.
However, none of the major emerging countries (e.g., Brazil, Russia, India,
China) has signed on to the EITI. The attitude toward transparency in these
countries makes international analysis of transparency in the extractive industries
and due diligence6 in the supply chain far more difﬁcult.7
Impacts So Far
Transparency goes beyond due diligence by enabling access to information that
was previously conﬁdential, and thus exposes multinational companies to reputa-
tional losses. Experience with implementing the transparency rules reveals a will-
ingness to learn. Initial skepticism about the EITI8 appears unfounded, as the EITI
has suspended some countries’ membership for non-compliance. At the other
end of the spectrum, Guinea, Ghana, and Liberia have actually outperformed the
standards. Over time, the indicators and evaluation criteria have improved. The
EITI, in cooperation with its partners, also offers training programs and engages
in capacity building. All its reports have been published and were evaluated in
early 2012. In May 2013, the EITI agreed on a new and improved set of standards.
The backlash against these initiatives, however, should not be underesti-
mated. Some industry players are concerned about competitive disadvantages,
mainly with regard to compliance costs and disclosure of sensitive commercial
information.9 By participating in the EITI, some ﬁrms may also pursue strategic
interests. The next years are likely to be challenging10 as state-owned enterprises
from emerging economies have competitive advantages, so mining companies
are now seeking to secure their positions by developing new business models
and establishing reputational advantages.
In crisis regions, however, it is unclear whether transparency creates in-
centives for the establishment of democratic and inclusive institutions and sus-
tainable development, or if fragile states more likely to be in thrall to criminal
organizations and authoritarian structures. Much will depend on the mobiliza-
tion of political will as well as on dissemination of those regulations in more
G20 countries and/or at stock exchanges.
6. Due diligence for responsible supply chains is deﬁned by OECD guidance on conﬂict minerals
(2010: 6) as an ongoing, proactive, and reactive process through which es can ensure that they
respect human rights and do not contribute to conﬂict.
7. See for a discussion on China: Mouan 2010; see in relation to the certiﬁcation of the coltan
mineral chain: Bleischwitz, Dittrich, Pierdicca 2012.
8. Aaronson 2011; Hauﬂer 2010; on community representation in Madagascar: Smith, Shepherd,
Dorward 2012.
9. See Clapp (2005); for a game theory-based analysis see Schuler 2012. For the lawsuit ﬁled by
the American Petroleum Institute see http://www.mainjustice.com/justanticorruption/2013/07/
02/judge-vacates-sec-dodd-frank-rule-for-extractive-industries-remands-to-sec/. Last accessed
June 18, 2014.
10. Humphreys 2012.
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Potential Longer-Term Impacts, Risks, and Opportunities
Longer-term challenges begin with non-compliance and enforcement. Some
major emerging economies may continue to evade transparency standards;
the market power of China in particular could hamper international coordina-
tion.11 Such weak links also impede promotion of resource efﬁciency along
international value chains.
Regarding resource use, challenges lie primarily in dealing with the
resource nexus,12 i.e., the global interaction between the various resources re-
quired to produce fuel and energy feed stocks, industrial inputs, and food.
While energy–water–food is a much-discussed nexus, this interaction applies
to mineral resources and land use as well, forcing extractive industries to address
the resource nexus. Accordingly, as expressed by the 2013 G8 declaration, land
transactions should be transparent and respect the rights of local communities;
this may include a right to water and food security.
Ultimately, the issue is about property rights and beneﬁt sharing. In 2011,
the revenue from Nigeria’s oil industry was 60 percent higher than total ofﬁcial
development assistance for the sub-Saharan African countries. Ghana, where
mining revenues for the state quadrupled from 2010 to 2011, demonstrates
potential achievements if all partners agree. In Latin America, extractive industry
revenue represents a growing and important share of total government revenue:
about one-third in Bolivia and Ecuador; 20 percent in Peru; and 13 percent
in Colombia.13 Should such increase in revenues become a worldwide trend,
opportunities for public investments spurring a sustainable and inclusive growth
will be tremendous.
Energy and mining companies are traditionally in a strong negotiating
position in resource-rich developing countries, as reﬂected in many of the con-
tracts concluded. However, this is changing. The 2012 nationalization of a
subsidiary of Spain’s Repsol in Argentina underlined the shift in power toward
the major extractive countries. The International Bar Association drafted a
model mining development agreement, which aims to achieve a balance of
interests. In Africa, new regional organizations such as the African Minerals
Development Centre, the African Legal Support Facility, and the African Tax
Administration Forum are emerging to support better natural resource gover-
nance with enhanced transparency.
Scenarios for the Future
In one possible risk scenario the emerging economies won’t be engaged and
a transparency divide deepens between supply chains that manage resources
11. Lee et al. 2012.
12. Andrews-Speed et al. 2012.
13. See on Ghana: http://eiti.org/news/ghana-eiti-reports-revenue-oil-and-gas-ﬁrst-time; see also
Baunsgaard et al. 2012; Daniel, Keen, McPherson 2010; Revenue Watch Institute 2013.
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sustainably and others that do not. Such divide will weaken implementation
and enforcement in the US and the EU considerably. Such a scenario likely
increases environmental impacts associated with extractive industries and
material-intensive value chains, because failures to implement transparency
norms are likely to be accompanied by implementation deﬁcits in environ-
mental norms. The existing links between illegal trade markets of all kinds
(drugs, trafﬁcking, resources, etc.), organized crime, terrorism, and poor
governance would also become stronger, affecting whole regions that may
become ungovernable. The security dimensions of supply chains, interna-
tional relations, human rights, and the environment are mutually reinforcing
a resource curse.14 Needless to say, all efforts to establish a circular econ-
omy and improve resource efﬁciency will face an uphill battle in such a
risk scenario.
Another scenario may grasp the opportunities of alleviating poverty,
achieving sustainable ﬁscal systems and implementing better governance in
resource-rich developing countries. This would encourage better monitoring
of environmental pressures and material ﬂows,15 and would establish best prac-
tices for extractive industries regarding energy and water use. Establishing green
sovereign wealth funds from resource revenues that potentially leverage invest-
ments in clean energy and resource efﬁciency from assets worth approximately
US$3 trillion in 201116—estimated to be twice as high as global hedge fund
assets—would create a difference for regional development. Such a scenario
would include positive side effects for supply chain security, lower price volatility,
and stable expectations that favor resource efﬁciency for manufacturing industries
and other eco-innovations.17 With resource revenues dwarﬁng development
aid, it is realistic to assume that a robust extractive industry and investment
in sustainable development could offer promising economic prospects for
the one hundred or so resource-rich developing countries and their 3.5 billion
people.
In both scenarios, the future of EITI is decisive. This organization has
produced success in recent years. Existing US and EU regulations may replace
some of its function; much could be gained, however, if EITI extends its reach
to public expenditures and environmental indicators such as the use of energy
and water and mining waste, and builds alliances to become accepted in emerg-
ing economies. To strengthen policies, EITI may use its national stakeholder
groups for deliberation processes on those issues and to develop national action
plans for sustainable resource management.
14. Bleischwitz, Johnson, and Dozler 2013.
15. See on material ﬂows and relevance for their environmental policy: Bringezu and Bleischwitz
2009.
16. See the op-ed on green sovereign wealth made by Emmanuel Guerin in ‘The Project Syndicate”
on May 13, 2013.
17. See EIO 2013 for discussion of eco-innovation, with particular focus on the EU.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The quest for more transparency comes from many actors and receives broad
support, but stronger coordination and leadership is required. Transparency’s
potential to inform and empower is key, but transparency is just one avenue
to better resource governance.18 A driving force to include key environmental
indicators could be the vision of increasing revenues and public investments
for green economies in resource-rich developing countries, with global prosper-
ity stemming from increasing resource efﬁciency and lowering environmental
risks along international value chains.
Given recent successes on the transparency agenda, it is not only essential
to ask for more, but also feasible to get more (Figure 1); I propose the following
pillars for more transparency and better environmental politics:
• All ﬁnancial transactions in extractive activities should be disclosed,
including those related to state-owned companies and sovereign wealth
funds. Transparency should be extended to relevant contracts and, indeed,
all public expenditures.
• Downstream, efforts should include the markets for recycling and dis-
posal, and key value chains for resource-intensive product groups. This
would also give incentives to increase resource efﬁciency.19
• Transparency efforts should reach out to emerging economies, while
the EITI stakeholder processes could promote national action plans for
sustainable resource management.
• An international, accessible data hub on resource use should be estab-
lished, to include core data on geological services and other organizations
such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Energy
Agency, and the Joint Organisations Data Initiative on oil and gas as well
as data on environmental pressures from use of energy, resource, and
water, and coefﬁcients for resource-intensive areas of production.
• Resource-rich developing countries should be encouraged to introduce
extraction taxes and support new ﬁscal systems20 to leverage investments
into sustainable consumption and production. UNEP’s International
Resource Panel, the Natural Resource Charter, and other tools21 might also
be helpful in establishing better governance.
Key ﬂanking policy initiatives at the international level could include a
multi-stakeholder forum for sustainable resource use,22 an international metal
covenant23 to promote recycling and material ﬂow management with industry
18. See also: Bringezu and Bleischwitz (2009); Gupta (2010: 4).
19. Bleischwitz, Welfens, Zhang 2011; McKinsey Global Institute 2011.
20. Daniel, Keen, McPherson 2010; Ghura, Pattillo, et al. 2012.
21. http://www.unep.org/resourcepanel/; http://naturalresourcecharter.org.
22. Heinrich Böll Stiftung (ed.) (2012).
23. Wilts, Bleischwitz (2011).
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involvement, and, over the longer term, an international agreement on sus-
tainable resource management with indicators and possibly incentives and targets
for lowering environmental pressure from resource use.
While the purpose of this forum is to stimulate debate, academics may also
be encouraged to carry out more in-depth research. Given the improvements in
data availability and the incoming implementation reports, evidence-based re-
search can obviously beneﬁt. Three areas seem especially important: (1) drivers
and barriers for companies and other market-based actors in their decision-
making about future resource investments and compliance with transparency
rules; (2) comparative country analyses on better resource governance and the
role of transparency with all potential improvements as discussed in this forum;
(3) the new geopolitics of resources, with strong emerging economies and their
state-owned enterprises vis-à-vis the transatlantic partnership favoring trans-
parency and better resource governance.
All such research will have an impact on how both ﬁnancial and environ-
mental transparency may unleash its transformative power along with better
governance structures and international politics. However, such fascinating
complexity should not hinder researchers from pledging that now is the time
to ask for more.
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